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ABSTRACT

This paper explores the relationship between schools as a force which perpetuates the social order and the aesthetic curriculum which is being introduced within schools. In the first part of the paper, the author explains how aesthetic experiences are unique and different from the day-to-day experiences of our lives. Aesthetic experiences, such as the appreciation of music or a work of art, not only provide pleasure in the acknowledgement of art but also indirectly create in the viewer an enlightened awareness of the natural order of the world which affects his interaction with society. In the second part of the paper, the author reviews theories that schools are an institution which perpetuates the existing social and economic order. By socializing children to accept levels of authority and by dividing curricula into categories such as vocational and college-preparatory, schools continually provide society and the labor force with graduates who unconsciously have accepted the current social and economic system. In the third part of the paper, the author describes one set of aesthetic education curriculum materials and explains how the format of the materials indirectly supports our modern social environment. The materials present musical passages in a segmented manner, not as entire works, and thereby promote student thinking that art (aesthetics) is merely another commodity in our society which can be segmented and packaged. (AV)

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Schools, Aesthetic Forms, and Social Reproduction

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Paper presented at Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association (San Francisco, California, April 1979)

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In an essay written nearly sixty years ago dealing with the nature of aesthetic experience, an "eminent authority" on painting as an art form is quoted as saying that, "The art of painting is the art of imitating solid objects upon a flat surface by means of pigments."[1] Now this is an extremely cryptic and, for that very reason, perhaps somewhat illuminating characterization of the work of artists. Consider the possibility that such a description of art, and by extension of the possibilities for aesthetic experience, captures the quality of our participation with art objects. Under these circumstances one would be forced to speculate that the rather vast amounts of time, energy, and literary space devoted to aesthetic participation might have been better spent gardening, playing pinochle, or fishing. If the value of aesthetic experience can be as narrowly analyzed and circumscribed as the above comment might lead us to believe, one wonders what all the fuss has been about.

We may find the above view of art and the aesthetic uncomfortably humorous, and even provocative politically in the way it shrivels the rather lofty pedestal upon which art and artists are frequently placed. Simplistic and disquieting as this depiction of art is, we may also find it intellectually stimulating and pedagogically useful in interesting ways. For even though this skeletal vision of art is somewhat laughable, it is neither immediately clear nor intuitively obvious how such accounts might be fleshed out. Indicating how this might be accomplished is the initial task of the present analysis.

After briefly sketching what I consider to be a fundamental value of the aesthetic experience, I will suggest why this value is seldom realized within our educational institutions, even in programs in "the arts" or those concerned with aesthetic education. I will argue that the ideological functions

of schools are served by our use of aesthetic forms within classrooms, both at the level of theory and within classroom materials. This analysis will involve situating our understanding of aesthetic forms and the use of aesthetic materials within the context of the discussion of how schools serve a reproductive function within U.S. society. By seeing the use of aesthetic forms as informing the debate over schools as agents of economic and cultural reproduction, I believe we may be able to understand and illuminate what is at issue in the "reproduction debate," as well as expand upon our view of the aesthetic. We will begin to see how aesthetic meanings, as concrete instantiations of cultural forms, may reflect and serve the reproductive role of educational institutions.

aesthetic value and ethical conduct

Works of art have been thought valuable and worthy of attention for a variety of reasons, ranging from their potential in imitating the real as opposed to apparent objects of understanding,[2] to their embodiment of The Beautiful,[3] to their possession of Significant Form,[4] and so on. Attempts such as these to describe or prescribe what about art is so engaging, while at times insightful, also seem inevitably to miss something important about our participation with art works.

In an article entitled "Justifying Aesthetic Education, K. A. and C. M. Smith come close to directly confronting the question of why participation with works of art is found valuable.[5] They poignantly ask, with respect to instruction in the arts, "What do both the individual and society stand to gain? What is the study of works of art good for?"[6] The authors take exception to the view that art serves no function at all but must be valued for its rather evanescent "intrinsic qualities," and for the intrinsic enjoyment or

pleasure they may provide. As the authors point out with respect to works of art, "What is desired is not the object as such but the pleasure or satisfaction of possessing, using, or experiencing it. Intrinsic value is... confined to experiences or states of mind and not to objects."[7] But, of course, this analysis of our participation with art objects merely pushes the debate over aesthetic value one step back: if it is the experience which we desire and find meaningful, and not the actual object of art, how and on what basis can we delineate the value of aesthetic experience? Now while this topic involves many intricate and complex philosophical issues, and could easily become the subject of one's life work, some indication of the direction such an inquiry might take seems necessary in an essay such as this.

Numerous attempts have been made by aestheticians to specify how aesthetic experiences are different from, or related to, more common, day to day encounters. Some writers have speculated that the essential difference between aesthetic and non-aesthetic experiences lies in the fact that in the latter cases we often feel constrained to act in certain ways due to ethical considerations.[8] We feel compelled to attempt the rescue of a drowning person, for example, because of such considerations as our sense of the value of human life, our duty to fellow human beings, and so on. In cases such as this our actions seem intimately related to various moral imperatives, based on ethical deliberation and judgment of some sort. Our experience with aesthetic objects, however, seems to entertain no such moral ramifications. In part because such experiences involve participation with objects (or people who, in adopting roles, become regarded as object-like in some way), moral deliberation and ethical conduct seem extraneous topics. Especially given the fact that the aesthetic experience is typically characterized as involving sustained, concentrated attention to the formal qualities of objects, the realm of moral judgment

seems foreign and distant. Yet I would argue that it is precisely in the connection between aesthetic meanings and ethical deliberation and conduct that aesthetic value most significantly resides.[9]

We say we act out of moral considerations because we conclude or believe that is the correct or proper course of action to follow; i.e., it is morally required of us as moral beings to act in such and such a way. As in our example of the drowning victim, we have certain moral guidelines which require us to do certain things in specific situations and refrain from doing others. We have some sort of (usually unwritten) "moral code" which helps us decide what to do under certain conditions. From time to time, of course, this code may change if we come to see that we have not fully considered, whether from a theoretical or empirical perspective, all the relevant facets of a given situation. I believe some such process of reconsideration can occur in our moral deliberations when we reflect on our aesthetic experiences. When an art work affects our thoughts and feelings in a profound and significant way, it also affects the way we feel about and think through the issues raised or the subject matter presented in the piece. Consider as an example here the award-winning documentary, Harlan County, U.S.A. At one level of appreciation we may consider the more formal, "surface features"[10] of this film- elements such as camera angle, the sequence and interrelationship of scenes, lighting techniques, musical elements and their relationship to these other features, and so on; an understanding and analysis of such elements can often be crucial in making sense of aesthetic objects, and such an analysis is therefore not unimportant. But the meaning of aesthetic objects goes beyond such a delineation of the object's formal qualities. Films such as Harlan County also say something that is of some personal significance to their audience. Specifically in this case viewers may come to understand something of the nature of workers' struggles

with mining companies in this country, this work of art may add another dimension or level of meaning to our attitude toward or way of looking at these and related events in society. And such changes in attitude, in ways of seeing and feeling, can also influence what we consider to be appropriate or desirable conduct. In causing us to rethink the relationship between worker and owner within the context of U.S. mining industries, the aesthetic participant may well be lead to think and act differently vis a vis people caught in such situations of economic and social exploitation.

Art and the aesthetic thus have the power to make us see our world differently, to view our individual and collective situations from a new perspective and change how we will respond to the events in our lives. When a work of art makes us see some object, person, or event in a new way, to consider it from a fresh perspective, it can inform and reform our perception of that object or event: "That nature imitates art is too timid a dictum. Nature is a product of art and discourse."[11] In short, if "What we see is what we get," and what we see is importantly affected by the kinds of aesthetic form we experience, then changing such form, giving the thing viewed new meaning, changes "what we get."

As Raymond Williams has cogently argued with respect to dramatic forms as indices of social change: "Complicated as it is by delay, by the unevenness of change, and by the natural variety of responses to change, only some of which achieve adequate communication, the outline surely exists, in which we can see drama, not only as a social act, but as a major and practical index of change and creator of consciousness."[12] More generally, perceiving aesthetic forms can make a genuine contribution to our knowledge of the world in which we live, and can provide us with alternative conceptions of different, alternative "worlds." Aesthetic forms can, in short, move the viewer to

enlightened social action. As D. W. Gotshalk has put this point, "...we act largely on the basis of what we value and cherish. And if the fine arts at their best refine these bases of behavior, making our capacities more able and our values more wide and discriminate, they constitute a discipline in decency and a modification of character from which decent social action can spring."[13] Ultimately, I want to suggest that the best aesthetic forms have meaning because they tell us something about our world and allow us to see both it and alternative possibilities in a way which fosters social action which is informed, responsive, and ethical.

This is only a potential value of the aesthetic experience, obviously. If we are only interested in the utility of paintings as a source of firewood, their impact upon social action will be minimal. While such an interest is admittedly far fetched, the general point I wish to make here is not: aesthetic experiences are only found valuable within some context or frame of reference. This is as true of educational institutions as it is of museums or art galleries, to mention only a few socio-physical contexts.

The sort of potential value for the aesthetic experience I have posited above is rarely manifested, I would argue, within the educational establishment of this country. The reason for this is not the inherent difficulty of doing such an analysis of aesthetic forms, nor that schools are "merely" pedagogically one-sided, emphasizing mathematics and the sciences to the detriment of the arts and humanities. Instead I would suggest that it is the political dimension inherent in these aesthetic experiences, their ability to make us see ourselves and our relation to others in new ways, that accounts for the lack of such aesthetic experience within schools. There is a basic, fundamental disharmony between such a political or, in Habermas's terms, "emancipatory"[14] aspect of aesthetic forms and the functions of schooling. The ideological function

of educational institutions militates against taking aesthetic forms seriously in the way characterized above.

To understand this fully requires that we outline the recent discussion of the reproductive role of our educational system. By seeing how schools occupy a less than neutral position within a matrix of other social institutions, we will be able to view the role of aesthetic forms within schools in a way which may aid in our understanding of both aesthetic meanings and the ideological function of schools in U.S. society.

schools as agents of reproduction

The traditions of achievement and socialization within the field of curriculum have been dominant in our thinking through educational issues.[15] These traditions have given rise to two ways of approaching curriculum form and content: 1) as Kliebard has argued, a technical and ameliorative posture has characterized our approach to classroom practice[16]; and 2) the view that schools are socially and politically neutral has dominated much educational theory and practice. In effect, technical concerns- from Franklin Bobbitt's "particularized objectives"[17] to Competency Based Teacher Education[18]- have served to defuse and displace more fundamental political and ethical debate within our educational discourse.

Increasingly, however, such a technical and apolitical stance has been seriously challenged. It was with the publication of Schooling in Capitalist America, by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, that attempts to situate schooling as one of a number of important institutions which help perpetuate the current social order gained respectability.[19] These authors view the function of schooling as founded on economic reproduction, wherein schools respond to the needs of a particular form of economic organization. This position is forcefully advanced in the authors' own view of socialization:

> Our critique of education and other aspects of human development in the United States fully recognizes the necessity of some form of socialization. The critical question is. What for? In the United States the human development experience is dominated by an undemocratic, irrational, and exploitative economic structure. Young people have no recourse from the requirements of the system but a life of poverty, dependence, and economic insecurity.[20]

Schools, that is, serve to produce a "finished product" that will have sufficiently mastered the requisite skills and dispositions to ensure the maintenance of American corporate capitalism; educational institutions function in a way that guarantees the reproduction of a particular economic form. There are, on the authors' view, four main components to this relationship between educational and economic structure. These include: 1) an adequate and appropriate labor supply provided by the educational establishment; 2) social relationships within schools which can be used to "facilitate the translation of labor power into profits"[21]; 3) a system of acknowledging, rewarding, and reinforcing personality traits which is shared by the school and the economic sphere; and 4) a stratified and hierarchical way of thinking about one's relationship with others which is developed in schools through a differential system of status and distinctions, and which has utility in the market place. Some specific examples from their own research may help in clarifying how, for the authors, a principle of correspondence exists which, in reproducing class structure and consciousness, perpetuates capitalist production. Looking at such examples will also allow us to see why theorists of economic reproduction see a posture of social and political neutrality with respect to educational institutions as an ideologically useful myth.

Bowles and Gintis argue that the social relationships within schools correspond to the division of labor, along hierarchical lines, within the economic order. Within educational institutions, vertical lines of authority exist and become part of everyday classroom experience, with students at the

low end of the power continuum, followed by teachers and administrators. This pattern of domination is in turn duplicated in many work places: individual workers stand on the bottom rung of the authority ladder, while the foreman or supervisor stands above them, with the manager/owner at the top looking down. Just as this pattern of social relations in the sphere of economic production creates alienatied labor, and an alienated work force, so too is the student alienated from his or her own educational experience. By training students in the public schools to regard these kinds of social relations and patterns of dominance as "normal" or necessary, students learn to habituate themselves to patterns of thought and ways of acting which assure the continuance of analogous relations of production in capitalist industry. As with many day to day decisions in the factory, the corporation, or the state bureaucracy, curricular and pedagogical decisions are made by those "above," often with little or no input from students whose daily lives are informed if not defined by such decisions. As well, students are typically evaluated in terms of criteria which they have little control over. This way of making educational decisions, i.e., via people who in some way stand above and independent of the students themselves, serves to produce in each student, "the types of personal demeanor, modes of self-presentation, self-image, and social-class identifications which are the crucial ingredients of job adequacy."[22] In this way schools "process" people who come to the market place equipped with the skills and attitudes requisite to the smooth, efficient operation of the economic machinery. "By attuning young people to a set of social relationships in schools similar to those of the work place, schooling attempts to gear the development of personal needs to its requirements."[23]

Bowles and Gintis further argue that schools function to prepare particular social groups for specific occupational slots, while reserving

different occupations for other groups. Not only are alternative curricula devised, for example, for vocationally-oriented and college-bound high school students, but different behavioral norms are enacted and enforced as well. And as each curricular form develops its own set of dispositional rules, social relations of widely varying sorts are facilitated. It is in the correspondence between these social relations within each curricular track and the norms mandated by particular occupational slots that, the authors allege, the potency of our economic system for school settings may be seen. "Thus in high school, vocational and general tracks emphasize rule-following and close supervision, while the college track tends toward a more open atmosphere emphasizing the internalization of norms."[24] Just as supervised rule following in contrast to internalization of norms is a mark of stratification within schools, so these same differences may be seen in the subsequent job prospects of each group. Since the working class ethos of supervised rule following tends to recur in working class schools and classrooms, and internalization of norms within middle class schools and classrooms, social class distinctions and their perpetuation are fostered by differing social relations within the educational establishment.

In contrast to the achievement and socialization traditions within the field of curriculum, theorists of economic reproduction view the activities of schools as intimately tied to the demands of a hierarchical, alienating economic system. School experience on this view furthers the interests of certain groups and classes while effectively curtailing those of others. Indeed in arguing for a correspondence between schooling and economic form, it seems that Bowles and Gintis are attempting to expose the perniciousness of the former by virtue of its complicity with the latter.

While I find the analysis provided by such theorists of economic reproduction illuminating in its characterization of how school life may be tied to economic form, we need to also recognize the very real shortcomings of such a correspondence theory. There are several ways in which such an analysis may be misleading if not inadequate. For example, it does little in the way of clarifying how the day to day experiences of classroom life - the "curriculum in use" of educational institutions - actually contributes to the continuance of an unequal distribution of goods and services within capitalist society; we are provided with little more than a "black box" view here, making it difficult to situate even the latent functions of schooling the authors discuss within a larger, more coherent relational theory.

Two other shortcomings of this theory of economic reproduction are of special interest for this essay. The correspondence view upon which the work of Bowles and Gintis is based 1) is a bit too mechanistic in its portrayal of the relationship between schooling and economic form and 2) focuses too exclusively on the economic sphere in discussing the reproductive role of schools. The social and ideological functions of educational institutions are simply not fully revealed by addressing only their economic purposes and affects, at least when these are narrowly conceived. As well, the relationship between schools and the social order is not that of object to mirror image; the interconnections are more complex and subtle than Bowles and Gintis suggest. This is not to deny the ties which serve to bind schools and economic production. Rather, to expose the ideological commitments of our educational system and make them a subject for analysis we need to go beyond "merely" its relationship to economic form, without losing sight of this vital aspect of social reproduction.

Several recent studies have been extremely useful in extending the reproductive debate in precisely this way. I have found the work of several

people, including Michael F. D. Young,[25] Basil Bernstein,[26] Pierre Bourdieu,[27] and Michael W. Apple,[28] helpful in clarifying my own understanding of these complex issues. It is, though, in Paul Willis's masterful study, Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs,[29] that the flaws inherent in a correspondence theory of social reproduction can be most dramatically seen.

Divided into ethnographic and analytic segments, Willis details the interplay between the school and work lives of working class boys attending secondary school in an industrial town in England. The relationship between this group's culture and the formal experiences and culture of the school is used by the author as an example of how working class ideology and cultural forms help reproduce class distinctions. In the process social control is maintained not by overt intervention or "outside" coercion, but by the development and solidification of what Antonio Gramsci referred to as cultural hegemony, or that "range of structures as well as values, attitudes, beliefs and morality that in various ways support the established order and the class interests which dominate it."[30]

The group of working class boys of which Willis writes, collectively referred to as "the lads" by the author, forms their own counter-culture while being immersed within the "official" or dominant culture of the school. They consciously exploit whatever "cracks" or "crevices" they can discover or create within the existing culture of the school in ways that allow some measure of control over their own lives. Indeed the lads define themselves in part at least on the basis of their rejection of and opposition to the established routines, activities, and culture of the school. "This opposition," Willis writes, "is expressed mainly as a style. It is lived out in countless small ways which are special to the school institution, instantly recognized by the teachers, and an almost ritualistic part of the daily fabric of life for

the kids."[31] Specific instances of such opposition are numerous: e.g., engaging in imaginary dialogue by silently mouthing words during instruction, derisive laughter as a teacher or another student passes in the hallway, a chorus of crackling knuckles during class, and so on. Now all of these can be seen as mere instances of deviant behavior from troublesome or delinquent students. Yet for the lads such gestures have another meaning, they become symbolic and almost ritualistic occasions which represent and solidify their rejection of the formal organization of the school, and their correlative status as members of a select and, at least in their own minds, superior culture and social group.[32]

Another group of students within this secondary school, the "ear'oles" (so termed because of their tendency to just sit and listen), accept and comply with the authority structure and culture of the school; these are the students who at least superficially agree with the rules and regulations of the school, who identify with the cultural activities and patterns embedded in the institution. Such students, as one might expect, help provide the day to day, concrete cultural symbols and artifacts which the lads make light of and reject. The ear'oles' acceptance of school rules, their dress, hair style, and mannerisms, is equated with the established culture of the school, just as such cultural patterns and the formal curriculum becomes part of a broader perspective felt as distant and alien by the lads. That is, the formal organization of the school, including both overt and hidden curriculum forms, and the mode of culture which is engendered and embodied in the ear'oles, is rejected by the lads. Rejection of school rules and authority, and the social relations they produce, is thus seen by the lads as symbolizing their rejection of the dominant, middle class culture of the school. Considering dress, for example, Willis says, "It is no accident that much of the conflict between

staff and students at the moment should take place over dress. [This conflict] is one of [the] elected grounds for the struggle over authority. It is one of the current forms of a fight between cultures. It can be resolved, finally, into a question about the legitimacy of school as an institution."[33] Dress and personal attractiveness, as well as smoking and drinking, are used by the lads as cultural symbols, ways to define and substantiate their repudiation of the ear'oles and school culture generally. It also, of course, helps define membership in their group. The following excerpt from a poem written by one of the lads in an English class, illustrates the social uses of such cultural symbolism:

> On a night we go out on
> the street
> Troubling other people,
> I suppose we're anti-social,
> But we enjoy it.
>
> The older generation
> They don't like our hair,
> Or the clothes we wear
> They seem to love running
> us down,
> I don't know what I would
> do if I didn't have the gang.[34]

Yet the culture of the school is not rejected only because the lads find it alienating and foreign. An essential ingredient of this refusal to participate in the official culture is that in a significant sense it is not real for the lads, it has no relationship to the working class world which surrounds them, their families, and their friends. The lads respond to school, in a sense, by embracing the more familiar and meaningful cultural forms of the working class, with its emphasis on physicality and masculinity, while rejecting any notion of intellectual work which the school in part embodies. Here we can see one crucial ideological distinction being formulated and engrained in the lads' rejection of schooling and school culture. Mental and manual labor-

"book learning" versus the pedagogy of the shop floor - become separate categories for the lads, and one of the central divisions which sustains their class identity. The reproductive function of schools is furthered by such distinctions and by the very rejection of official culture within the school. In rejecting mental labor, and the ear'oles as the personification of such labor, the lads maintain their own class standing and help cement class distinctions.

In this way what Willis terms the "penetrations" made by the lads - this group's rejection of school culture as in some way ingenuine and its simultaneous utility in providing opportunities for "having a laff" - has inherent social contradictions. In asserting the superiority of masculine working class jobs and culture, in preferring manual to mental labor, the lads also suggest or comply with the division of labor along sexual lines. Thus in penetrating the dominant school culture, in exposing it as foreign and alienating to their own experience, the lads implicitly further such sexual and economic divisions. Though the lads act relatively autonomously in penetrating cultural forms established and practiced in the school, social reproduction is actually enhanced in the very process.

Willis's study is important for several reasons, and has clear implications for correspondence theories such as the one offered by Bowles and Gintis. Willis illustrates, in convincing detail, how and why such correspondence theories fail in their analysis of reproduction. It is simply not the case that the needs of capitalist production result in the imposition of certain dispositions, personality traits, and ways of thinking on students who acquiesce to and act on such economic needs. At least some important elements of the capitalist work force, as we can see from Willis's research, are produced in the process of rejecting the skills, propensities, and cultural

symbols necessitated by capitalist production and perpetuated by schools; the contradictions built into the lads' penetrations of the official culture serve to solidify social class standing and working class ideology. The response of the lads within school gives them strength as members of a valued group while equipping them for employment in work that will ensure the continuation of their class history and social status.

Secondly, Willis shows how a particular set of economic realities is accompanied by various social and cultural forms which the lads find persuasive. A good deal of the lads' rejection of mental labor and book learning, for example, has to do with the discontinuity between the cultural symbols upheld by the school (voluntary rule following, specific styles of dress and personal appearance, a certain sense of sobriety, and the like) and the working class culture in which the lads themselves are immersed. The world of the lads contains its own network of cultural symbols and values, far removed from the dominant culture of the school. These cultural forms are not perceived as something other than, or in addition to, their economic and social standing. For the lads these cultural patterns are felt to be an essential ingredient of daily life, a part of their existential reality.

This has direct relevance for our previous discussion of aesthetic value. For what I am urging here, in a more general way, is that we see cultural and economic forms - or, if you like, ideology and the relations of production - as intimately linked and conjoined. These areas are not as separable or isolated as many would have us believe; though thinking of culture as divorced from social relations and economic production may itself serve an ideological function in a society such as ours. That is, it may be politically useful for people to think of culture, especially those forms which potentially serve emancipatory interests, as abstracted from daily life and social

exchange. As Marx said in The German Ideology, "The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production... The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas..."[35] In Marxist terminology, we must begin to see superstructure and infrastructure not as distinct levels with some causal relationship obtaining between them, but as different aspects of the same social forces. "Ideology is not," Terry Eagleton has argued, "a set of doctrines; it signifies the way men live out their roles in class-society, the values, ideas, and images which tie them to their social function."[36] Learning to Labor provides an excellent example of how ideological forces persist in the day to day lived experiences we all share in. As ideological influences, the cultural images which tie the lads to their social function must be seen as contributing to the reproduction of social class divisions and the development of hegemony. No intervention by a "repressive" or "dictatorial" state is necessary to perpetuate the social order in its present form. Thus to understand the reproductive role of educational institutions requires a sensitivity to how cultural forms reinforce and interpenetrate ideological influences and economic "needs". A part of this understanding lies in seeing how our treatment of the aesthetic within classrooms serves a reproductive function.

aesthetics and social reproduction

To briefly reiterate, it was argued in the previous section of this piece that schools are a force for social reproduction, and that cultural meanings are an important component of this process of reproduction. if this is so, it is reasonable to expect that how we think about and utilize aesthetic

forms in classroom settings will play a significant role in social reproduction. We can, I believe, see this role in both the realm of aesthetic theory and in concrete proposals for aesthetic education.

Attempts to implement a serious program of aesthetics in schools have received increasing attention over the last decade or two. In creating proposals for implementing aesthetics in the curriculum, various theoretical constructs have of necessity been utilized. In particular I believe a phenomenological perspective has been advanced by writers in the field which has affected our vision of the aesthetic and its use within schools. The work of Harry S. Broudy is especially informative in this regard.

In arguing for his characterization of aesthetic experience, Broudy says that what is necessary on the part of aesthetic educators is "some general agreement on the rough outlines of the territory we have called the aesthetic surface or, more correctly, on the conditions for the apprehension of the aesthetic surface. I suggest," Broudy continues, "that there is considerable agreement on at least two of these conditions or characteristics. [The first is that] Whatever qualities are attributed to the work of art or the aesthetic object are to be perceived as being <u>in</u> the object."[37] In the same vein, Broudy comments, "Aesthetic perception . . . attends to the appearance of things for the sake of the appearance and not for something beyond it to which it is a clue. Whatever meaning or import the aesthetic object has it displays on its surface."[38] Aesthetic meanings, on this view, exist in the object or phenomenon itself, and it is to the aesthetic surface that we must turn to uncover them.

In discussing what makes an object, event, or image capable of providing us with an aesthetic experience, Broudy also says that, "in aesthetic perception the object has to be perceived as a particular individual entity

and in its entirety... that habit of apprehending the sensory properties of objects in their fulness and richness is the first step in aesthetic education."[39] This notion, letting the object under consideration become the central focus of attention during our aesthetic experiences, is an entrenched part of what has come to be called the "aesthetic attitude."[40] Such attitudinal theories of aesthetic experience have a long and controversial history[41]; several elements are typically thought to coalesce in the development of this attitude. Among these are: the "displacement of the practical," wherein practical concerns which may affect our aesthetic judgment are dismissed[42]; a loss of the awareness of "self," that aspect of our consciousness with various needs and desires; and the centralization of the object itself as it becomes the primary focus for our attention.[43] In the process of aesthetic contemplation of this sort, then, we must divest ourselves of the usual practical interest we have in objects and events and thereby experience the aesthetic object disinterestedly and intrinsically. Thus Broudy cautions that, "aesthetic education may go wrong in several ways. One way lies in using aesthetic materials not for their intrinsic value but solely as instrumental to other extra-aesthetic ones."[44] We can see here how attitudinal theories of the aesthetic experience issue in a phenomenological perspective that acts as a lens through which our aesthetic experiences are to be seen; such theories of the aesthetic experience have important consequences for how we view and value aesthetic objects. Put another way, the theoretical underpinnings we bring to our participation with aesthetic objects directly influence the kind and quality of those aesthetic encounters.

There are intricate and difficult philosophical issues involved in a phenomenological perspective such as the one presented by Broudy; I have argued elsewhere that such a perspective may be conceptually misguided in

placing impossible restraint on participants in aesthetic experiences.[45] For purposes of the present analysis, however, other aspects of this view deserve special recognition.

Recall our initial discussion of aesthetic value. It was argued in the first section of this essay that aesthetic value is connected to ethical deliberation and enlightened social action; in this way aesthetic experience contains a political element, in affecting how we view, feel about, and value our world. But, as we saw in the discussion of the role of schools as agents of economic reproduction, such a political dimension may well be incompatible with the functional ideology of our educational institutions. That is, the role of schooling as an agent of social reproduction may work against the emancipatory component of aesthetic forms. Indeed when the lads in Willis's research rejected the established and "authentic" cultural patterns embedded in the school, they both asserted their own identity and confirmed their social station. The consequences of actually pursuing diverse aesthetic meanings in the way suggested earlier might well be perceived as a threat to the established culture and routines of the school. It is, in other words, crucial to the reproductive function of our educational institutions that aesthetic forms not be viewed in political terms. Notice now something interesting about the aesthetic views of Broudy, the phenomenological perspective and attitudinal stance, we have just considered. They are, quite explicitly, cast in apolitical and non-ideological terms. For example, Broudy argues that, "aesthetic education is... the training of imaginative perception to enable the pupil to apprehend sensory content, formed into an image that expresses some feeling quality. So stated, aesthetic education does not concern itself with propagandizing for any specific ideology or way of life."[46] Even more dramatically, Broudy instructs us that "it is naive to believe that

art cannot endanger morals. It can if the viewer is unable to perceive art objects aesthetically, and the untrained perceiver is likely to have this infirmity."[47] The demarcation between aesthetics and ethics is explicitly maintained in this passage; indeed to a large extent aesthetic experience is defined as the very absence of any but the most formalistic concerns for aesthetic objects. In this way ethical and political non-involvement or "neutrality" are taken to be a necessary exercise of the proper, phenomenological, aesthetic attitude.

It is dangerously easy, in responding to views of the aesthetic such as the one outlined above, to develop an overly deterministic model regarding the relationship between economic, political, and cultural forms, to suggest a one to one correspondence between aesthetics and the "mode of production." But such a correspondence view would be misleading in just the way correspondence theories of economic reproduction are: it could not account for the sort of contradictions or "penetrations" which, as we saw in the work of Paul Willis, become a living, vital part of cultural practice. In addition, a good deal of our current formulations of aesthetic theory have been generated in response to the relatively autonomous development of cultural and artistic practices generally. These practices and traditions do not fit the mirror image perspective postulated by such "vulgar" theories of correspondence. On the other hand, it is important that we see such developments as only relatively autonomous, and that we view cultural practices as mediated and informed by social and economic realities. Though such practices are not strictly determined by economic and political exigencies, neither are they independent of them. Thus, contrary to Broudy's assertion of ethical and ideological neutrality, I would suggest that we consider the possibility that it is, in part, the very political orientation such a view

encompasses that accounts for its acceptance within school practice. The phenomenological perspective taken in the above view of aesthetics and the curriculum- its emphasis on intrinsic value, object centrality, the apolitical nature of aesthetic experience, and so on- does I believe have an implicit political stance; further, we need to ask whether it is the compatibility of this stance with the reproductive functions of schooling that might reinforce its perceived legitimacy as a theory of aesthetics and the curriculum. This deserves some clarification.

The views of Professor Broudy on aesthetic education can be understood as embodying political commitments in at least two ways. In the first place, such a position discounts the previously discussed emancipatory potential of aesthetic participation. In seeing aesthetics as divorced from ethics, Broudy's explication prohibits such an emancipatory potential from being realized. We are instructed to consider only the "intrinsic value" of aesthetic materials, and that the notion of aesthetic forms affecting moral judgment amounts to an "infirmity," thus negating the role of aesthetic forms in helping us actively construct, make sense of, and provide meaning to our world. Such depoliticizing of aesthetic forms is not, I would suggest, necessarily apolitical; this characterization of the aesthetic experience may itself serve distinctly different, nearly opposite political interests than the view of aesthetic forms as emancipatory. It may further, that is to say, somewhat conservative political interests in treating existing social structures as aesthetically irrelevant.

Secondly, the views of Broudy regarding aesthetic education assume a neutral context or "background" for their implementation. Broudy assumes a context-free or, again, neutral background against which aesthetic participation is given meaning. Though I am sceptical whether this is ever

possible, or even desirable, in the context of schooling such a view is naive at best. Schools, as we have seen, serve to perpetuate a particular social order with specific social, political, and economic consequences. As such they are not neutral in the way that the achievement and socialization traditions in the field of curriculum, for example, presume. Moreover, as we saw in the research of Willis, the cultural forms which give these non-neutral consequences meaning within our educational institutions are likewise less than neutral. Thus we need to be more aware of the political implications of aesthetic materials, especially as they become utilized within schools, than Broudy's view would seem to allow. Indeed in the very process of assuming a mask of neutrality, the views of Professor Broudy, like the socialization and achievement traditions discussed earlier, may themselves serve an ideological function by serving to hide the reproductive function the school exhibits.

In this way the acceptance of such views as Professor Broudy's as guideposts for aesthetic education may be assisted by their ideological compatibility and utility within our educational system, as distinct from the adequacy or cogency of these proposals. While we have seen how the reproductive function of schools may in a sense be furthered by a particular aesthetic theory, it remains to be shown how such a function affects actual classroom practice in aesthetic education.

One of the most complete sets of curriculum materials in the field of aesthetic education has been developed by CEMREL, Inc. Their program in aesthetic education, "The Five Sense Store," provides an excellent opportunity for analyzing how aesthetic forms get used in classroom situations.

The materials themselves are divided along typical curricular lines involving scope and sequence, with different activities to be undertaken

at suggested grade levels. Individual lessons are also divided into smaller components, with descriptions of the "concept," "objective," "materials," and "procedure" that will be pursued and utilized during the lesson. In their literature on the Five Sense Store program, the CEMREL authors state that, "All packages are designed with the general classroom teacher in mind. Each teacher package includes a guide to general and specific objectives, evaluation, classroom management, and step-by-step lesson plans as well as all necessary media materials. Each student package provides all necessary activity material."[48] These materials are prepackaged along the lines of many curriculum kits to be, in effect, "teacher proof." Instructions in the teacher's manual are specific, detailed, and systematic, with little room for "error." Two points about such packaging of materials in aesthetic education deserve mention here, if only in passing. First, though the idea of unrestrained and undirected activity within classrooms is not an ideal we should strive to implement in aesthetic education, prespecifying objectives and procedures in the way CEMREL does may be antithetical to developing aesthetic understanding and sensitivity. In prescribing ends, means, and methods of evaluation, this mode of pedagogy may in fact contradict something important about aesthetic knowledge. As Dwayne Huebner has suggested in urging that classroom activity be viewed aesthetically, "The intent... is not a search for preconceived ends but a search for beauty, for integrity and form and the peace which accompanies them, and for truth as life is revealed through the acting and speaking of the participants."[49] It is difficult to see how such a pursuit of beauty, integrity, and truth within the realm of aesthetics (or, in the terms of the present analysis, how the emancipatory capacity of aesthetic forms) is compatible with the packaging of aesthetic materials in the way exhibited in the CEMREL program. The search for truth

seems to become instead a search for the appropriate, prespecified and "objectified" response.

Secondly, by utilizing this particular pedagogical form, by stating objectives in behavioral terms, using the familiar pre-test--instruction--post-test triad, systematically prespecifying response, and so on, CEMREL is "buying into" a particular tradition in curriculum development. This tradition embodies concerns for efficiency, systems management, and technical control, among others. As Apple for instance has argued of such a "technological" posture in the curriculum field, "systems management procedures are not interest-free. Their own constitutive interest lies primarily in, and has the social consequence of, effecting and maintaining technical control and certainty... it is aimed, fundamentally, at the regularities of human behavior... It is, hence, essentially manipulative."[50] Thus the organizational form of the materials under investigation may be seen as containing a technical, manipulative, and essentially conservative orientation in substituting an "educational technocracy" for a more liberating "construction of meanings" by teacher and student.

How the content of this set of curriculum materials may be tied to such an orientation, and to the reproductive function of schooling, is also in need of analysis. By examining a related attempt to uncover the social significance of cultural forms, we may be in a better position to see how these instructional materials are related to the school's ideological function.

In his discussion of "programming as a sequence or flow in television," Raymond Williams urges us to consider this cultural form from a different and insightful perspective.[51] He says that while we are used to seeing the array of news shows, commercials, various network interruptions,

and a wide variety of dramatic and sports shows as "main events" interspersed with various interruptions or distractions, these elements are actually parts of a larger totality which help give meaning to this cultural practice. As Williams puts this point, "the real programme that is offered is a sequence, or set of alternative sequences... which are... available in a single dimension and in a single operation."[52] Williams urges us to see the phenomenon of television as containing a sequential continuum of events, not as a series of discrete visual and auditory images which govern our viewing and become disrupted by other messages. The meaning of television lies in the totality of the experience, rather than in time intervals which we see as particular and individuated.

This perspective is, of course, seldom consciously entertained by television viewers; we watch television, on the surface at least, to see a specific production that is being broadcast. Yet Williams maintains that "many of us sit there [in front of the television set for several hours in succession], and much of the critical significance of television must be related to this fact."[53] Commenting on this critical significance, Williams writes, "The apparently disjointed 'sequence' of items is in effect guided by a remarkably consistent set of cultural relationships: a flow of consummable reports and products, in which the elements of speed, variety and miscellaneity can be seen as organising: the real bearers of value."[54] With respect to news reporting, such bearers of value become a bit more transparent: "At one level the average length of a news item is in effect determined by the time-unit of attention which the commercials have established. Nothing is at all fully reported... Yet the flow of hurried items establishes a sense of the world: of surprising and miscellaneous events coming in, tumbling over each other, from all sides."[55] Thus it is in the flow of television, the sequence of programs, commercial and other interruptions, newscasts, specials, and so

on, that the cultural messages exist and take on meaning. And the meaning they take on is dialectically related to the way viewers think about the experiences which make up their world.

This analysis of the impact of television as a cultural form has direct application to our understanding of the aesthetic education materials developed by CEMREL. Before undertaking an explication such as this, however, a word of gratitude is in order. For those of us concerned with and committed to the worth of aesthetic experience and the promotion of aesthetic value, programs such as the one produced by CEMREL are obviously welcome. They provide important first attempts at implementing a serious program of aesthetic experiences within public school classrooms. Yet at the same time we should not dismiss the possibility that other functions, not unlike those found in television production, may be served by the utilization of such materials. So while we welcome the advent of such forays into the realm of aesthetics and the curriculum, we must also be sensitive to these latent functions of aesthetic productions and practices.

Consider, for example, the way the CEMREL program is organized. In packaging materials for aesthetic education something of importance happens to their perceived status. Aesthetic forms in the process become increasingly thought of as commodities on a market, with a specific exchange value; anyone with sufficient economic capital can thus purchase these aesthetic forms. This fact itself has contradictions built into it. For while such a state of affairs does allow aesthetic materials to be experienced and appreciated by larger and potentially more diverse audiences, the meanings they embody also become filtered through this commodification. To the extent that aesthetic forms are increasingly seen as adhering and responding to market values, their emancipatory potential becomes reduced, or at least felt as

subsidiary. With increased commodification comes the tendency to think about such materials in terms of their position in a market place filled with other objects and commodities, not as potentially emancipatory forms of personal meaning which can aid in the construction of our sense of reality.

The CEMREL materials dealing with rhythm and meter, as a case in point, are designed to "investigate rhythm meter, and metrical notat ion in music. These concepts relate to rhythm and pattern in the environment."[56] After displaying a large chart on which duple meter is depicted by using barlines, measures, and accent marks, Lesson one begins with the teacher playing an accompanying record. The students hear various excerpts from musical selections which contain duple meter. Each selection is recorded twice; during the first recording the students are to "listen carefully," and when, after a short pause, the selection is repeated they are to "clap to each beat or line." This process is repeated until all the selections for the lesson have been played; then the same procedure is initiated for musical selections containing triple meter, mixed and odd time meters, and so on, which comprise the other lessons. After nine lessons of this type, during which a stated percentage of the class must "respond correctly" before proceeding, students are given a post test to determine their level of mastery. As one might expect, the tests replicate the activities done in the preceding lessons.

During the actual lessons, as well as during the testing sessions. only small segments of the musical selections which become the means for identifying a specific rhythmic configuration are played. Thus, for example, the students hear eight or ten measures of "Jimmy Crack Corn" and the second movement of Beethoven's Symphony Number 7 in A, Op. 92, by Bruno Walter. After hearing segments from such musical selections once, and then responding

to the subsequent playing by clapping their hands to the beat or line, another selection is played and similar procedures followed until that lesson is completed.

Like the actual sequence or flow of visual images across our television screens, it is this way of experiencing musical selections that becomes significant from a critical perspective. Each piece of music becomes segmentized, further legitimating its status as a commodity to be consumed and then discarded. Since students listen to each piece for what it exemplifies in terms of its internal rhythm or meter only, the meaning of the music itself becomes narrowly circumscribed; at the same time, the cultural significance of this sequence of lessons increases. Each musical selection becomes partitioned off or bracketed, attention given to it only for the sake of its compliance with certain rhythmic regularities. In the process, cultural forms become "disembodied" in a sense, and the meaning of the musical forms themselves constricted. It is this compartmentalizing and commodification process regarding musical meaning and cultural forms that is especially interesting. What, that is, do we tacitly teach children in the process of segmenting cultural forms in this way?

Though answers to such questions must always, in some sense, be suggestive rather than definitive, let us see how such an analysis might be undertaken. It seems to me that in treating aesthetic forms as commodities and segmenting and abstracting from them for specific "instructional objectives," we influence the way students view and value cultural forms. Instead of focusing on how cultural creations can tell us something about ourselves and our relationship to others, these cultural objects are divided and abridged to conform to instructional ends. 'The real bearers of value' in this case, to paraphrase Williams, are not the discrete selections themselves, nor the way

these selections provide insight into musical rhythm and meter, but the disjointed sequence of the musical experience itself: a consistent pattern of consummable products and messages which has cultural meaning and significance. In providing relatively random excerpts from musical selections, students are lead to see cultural forms as disjointed and of value only in reaching some "correct," prespecified objective. Cultural forms in the process become perceived as a "commodity" one uses to achieve the "desired outcome."

This pattern, I would argue, is rather closely related to, and consistent with, other social forces. The tendency to segment and isolate experience, to think of it in terms of disconnected units and compartmentalized activities, can be seen in settings ranging from a General Motors assembly line to large state universities. Such a mode of thought has, perhaps, even attained the status of something approaching a "world view": it has become a part of our collective consciousness, an unstated assumption in many kinds of activities. Through the increased tendency toward division of labor, specialization, and what may be called "task analysis" where complex activities are broken down into smaller component units, the tendency for experience to become increasingly fragmented is supported by social and economic forms of interaction; our work and social lives are more and more dominated by such individuation and segmentation.

Providing cultural experiences in schools which are segmented and isolated in a similar way may both respond to and serve these social ends. Notice that I am not suggesting here that the curriculum materials developed by CEMREL, much less the staff that developed them, are mere pawns in some political and economic chess game; this is not a thinly veiled conspiracy theory of cultural production and meaning. Rather I am suggesting that the tendency to fracture experience into isolated segments has become a part of

our social identity; and that social, economic, and cultural forces jointly act to propel the emergence of such a perspective.

Yet in isolating experiences and activities in this way we must also raise serious questions about its possible ideological implications. For example, does the isolation of discrete activities obscure larger patterns of dominance and exploitation in society; does it increase the difficulty of forming alliances with other individuals and groups in pursuing collective action; whose interests are served in the process of such isolation; and so on. These are all difficult issues beyond the scope of this analysis. In a general way, however, I would suggest that the tendency to see experience as composed of discrete, unconnected segments, may serve to make problematic more encompassing, macro theories and explanations of social events. Further, utilizing aesthetic materials in a way that furthers such divisions may serve to perpetuate this way of thinking. As such, the CEMREL materials themselves may be tied to a way of thinking and reflecting that is linked with particular, politically and ideologically useful, modes of thought. And in supporting such ideologically adventitious modes of thought, aesthetic forms assist in the reproductive function of our educational system. This way of seeing and evaluating cultural forms within our educational system, that is, has utility for the way we come to view our participation in the larger social order, including those economic and political exchanges which form a part of our day to day existence.

We have traveled a long and somewhat circuitous route since considering the view that painting consists in imitating objects on a flat surface using pigments. Or have we? For in seeing this initial sketch as inadequate I hope we may now perceive more clearly what is at stake— beyond mere pigments, solid objects, and imitation— if we take the aesthetic as a serious, life-generating force. We cannot afford to close our eyes, or our hearts, to such perceptions.

NOTES

[1] Quoted in Roger Fry, "An Essay in Aesthetics," reprinted in Problems in Aesthetics, second edition, Morris Weitz, editor (London: The Macmillan Company, 1970), p. 49.

[2] Contrary to popular belief, I think such a potential was recognized by Plato in his writings; see Landon E. Beyer, "An 'Ancient Enmity' Reexamined: Plato on Art," unpublished Master's paper, The University of Wisconsin- Madison, Department of Philosophy.

[3] See for example Plotinus, "Art as Beauty," reprinted in Weitz, Problems in Aesthetics, pp. 25-37.

[4] See for example Clive Bell, Art (London: Chatto & Windus, 1914).

[5] See Ralph A. Smith and Christinia M. Smith, "Justifying Aesthetic Education," in Aesthetics and Problems of Education, ed. Ralph A. Smith (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971).

[6] Ibid., p. 126.

[7] Ibid., p. 127.

[8] See Roger Fry, "An Essay in Aesthetics," in Weitz, Problems in Aesthetics.

[9] See Landon E. Beyer, "Objectivity, Autonomy, and Aesthetic Evaluation," The Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 8, No. 3, July, 1974, pp. 107-116.

[10] See for example J. O. Urmson, "What Makes a Situation Aesthetic?", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 36 (1957), pp. 75-106.

[11] Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), p. 33.

[12] Raymond Williams, The Long Revolution (London: Chatto & Windus Ltd., 1961), p. 273.

[13] D. W. Gotshalk, Art and the Social Order, 2nd edition (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1962), p. 213.

[14] See Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971).

[15] Michael W. Apple, "Ideology, Reproduction, and Educational Reform," Comparative Education Review XXII, October 1978.

[16] See Herbert M. Kliebard, "Persistent Curriculum Issues in Historical Perspective," reprinted in Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, ed. William Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975).

[17] Ibid., p. 45.

[18] For an interesting treatment of the philosophical and legal issues involved here see Peter Goldstone, "A Plea for Incompetence," in the 1978 Philosophy of Education Society Proceedings.

[19] Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America (New York: Basic Books, 1976).

[20] Ibid., p. 130.

[21] Ibid., p. 129.

[22] Ibid., p. 131.

[23] Ibid., p. 131.

[24] Ibid., p. 132.

[25] See Michael F. D. Young, Knowledge and Control (London: Collier-MacMillan Publishers, 1971).

[26] Basil Bernstein, Class, Codes, and Control, Volume 3: Towards a Theory of Educational Transmissions (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975).

[27] Pierre Bourdieu and Jean Claude Passeron, Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture (London: Sage, 1977).

[28] Michael W. Apple, Ideology and Curriculum (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979).

[29] Paul Willis, Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs (Lexington: D. C. Heath, 1977).

[30] Madeline MacDonald, The Curriculum and Cultural Reproduction (Milton Keynes, England: Open University Press, 1977), pp. 68-69.

[31] Willis, op. cit., p. 12.

[32] Willis says on page 12 of his study, "'the lads' not only reject but feel superior to the 'ear'oles.'"

[33] Willis, p. 18.

[34] Ibid., p. 22.

[35] Quoted in Frederic L. Bender, ed., Karl Marx: The Essential Writings (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), p. 183.

[36] Terry Eagleton, Marxism and Literary Criticism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 6.

[37] Harry S. Broudy, "Preparing Teachers of Aesthetic Education," in Teacher Education for Aesthetic Education: A Progress Report (St. Ann, Missouri: CEMREL, Inc., 1972).

[38] Ibid., p. 10.

[39] Harry S. Broudy, Enlightened Cherishing: An Essay in Aesthetic Education (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972), pp. 29-31.

[40] See Landon E. Beyer, "Objectivity, Autonomy, and Aesthetic Evaluation."

[41] See for example Jerome Stolnitz, Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Criticism (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), especially chapter 2, "The Aesthetic Attitude"; and George Dickie, Aesthetics: An Introduction (New York: Pegasus, 1971), especially chapter 5, "The Aesthetic Attitude."

[42] D. W. Gotshalk, Art and the Social Order, p. 6.

[43] See Edward Bullough, "'Psychical Distance' as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle," in Weitz, Problems in Aesthetics.

[44] Broudy, Enlightened Cherishing, p. 51.

[45] See Landon E. Beyer, "Aesthetic Theory and the Ideology of Educational Institutions," Curriculum Inquiry, January, 1979.

[46] Broudy, Enlightened Cherishing, p. 57.

[47] Ibid., p. 48.

[48] The Five Sense Store: The Aesthetic Education Program, CEMREL, Inc., p. 3.

[49] Dwayne Huebner, "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings," reprinted in William Pinar, ed., Curriculum Theorizing, p. 232.

[50] Michael W. Apple, "The Adequzcy of Systems Management Procedures in Education," Journal of Educational Research, September, 1972.

[51] Raymond Williams, Television: Technology and Cultural Form (New York: Schocken Books, 1974).

[52] Ibid., p. 87.

[53] Ibid., pp. 95-96.

[54] Ibid., p. 105.

[55] Ibid., p. 116.

[56] The Five Sense Store, p. 9.